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Abstract: It would be no exaggeration to say that the study of forests as commons 
has been central to the development of scholarship on common property. Equally 
certainly, the interest in forests has generated a vast corpus of research outside the 
field of common property. The  magnitude, variety, and depth of this body of research 
is an accurate reflection of the many different ways in which forests have been and 
continue to be central to human survival, livelihoods, and prosperity.
This paper reviews some of the central concerns and findings of writings on for-
ests as they related to the theoretical ambitions of commons scholars, and to efforts 
to govern forests more sustainably and equitably. The review is especially important 
in the context of unfolding efforts to govern forests in new ways over the past two 
decades. But as important as the review is an assessment of the achievements of 
this literature, existing blind-spots, and potential new areas of exciting research and 
investigation. The review suggests specific areas in relation to methods, data, and 
theories of common property that will advance the field further.
1. Introduction
The study of forests as commons has been one of the central sources of stimulus 
to the development of scholarship on common property. Not only did some of the 
earliest contributions to the study of commons focus on forests,1 the fact that forests 
1
 See, as examples, contributions in several edited volumes in the late 1980s and early 1990s that 
focused on forests (Berkes 1989, McCay and Acheson 1987, NRC 1986). Singh 1986 and Stanley 1991 
are some other early contributions.
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yield multiple products over which diverse stakeholders assert competing claims 
means that addressing governance problems in forests can be especially instruc-
tive for social-theoretical advancement (Jessup and Peluso 1986). Of course, in-
tellectual traffic has proceeded in both directions. If scholars of common property 
have gained theoretically by examining how forests can be governed effectively, 
they have also offered much to those interested in forest governance (Arnold and 
Stewart 1991; Fernandes et al. 1988; Gibson et al. 2000; Peluso 1992; Sivara-
makrishnan 1999).
In consonance with much research on other types of common-pool resources, 
scholars of forest-based commons also focus primarily on how variations in in-
stitutional arrangements shape resource-related outcomes. Some of their signal 
contributions to the work on commons, and to an understanding of collective 
action more generally, have concerned principles of institutional design (Ostrom 
1999), the need for fit between institutions and their political-ecological context 
(Dietz et al. 2003; Ribot 1999), the nature of institutional mediation (Agrawal and 
Yadama 1997), the importance of local enforcement (Agrawal 2005; Gibson et 
al. 2005), possibilities of social resistance (Guha 1989; Peluso 1992), the neces-
sity of broad-based participation in institutionalized governance (Ribot 2002), the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and forests (Rangan and Lane 2001), 
and the role of local variation in shaping resource-related outcomes (Agrawal and 
Chhatre 2006). Collectively, these contributions also constitute a remarkable step 
toward improving our understanding of how resources can be governed better.
In the next section, this paper outlines the domain of the research on forest-
based commons by examining how ownership rights in relation to forests are 
broadly distributed in different parts of the world. Section three surveys some of 
the central concerns and findings of writings on the commons as they relate to 
forests. It examines theoretical and empirical contributions by keeping in mind 
that much of the research on forest-based commons contributes directly to an un-
derstanding of policy concerns related to forest governance. Examining the con-
tributions of the research on forest-based commons helps identify the importance 
of property rights arrangements, local levels of use and management, and commu-
nal relationships that often frame local governance. Section four examines gaps 
related to data, theory, and methods in the study of forest-based commons. The 
conclusion outlines some pressing and exciting new areas for future research.
This paper is generally concerned with reviewing the commons literature that 
focuses on forests. In consequence, it pays relatively limited attention to scholar-
ship that is neither about the commons, or which does not concern forests. Fur-
ther, because the review is selective rather than scientifically exhaustive, it neces-
sarily presents a selective picture of the research with which it is concerned, as 
indeed do all reviews.
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2. Forests and common property
At some four billion hectares, forests cover nearly 30 percent of the global land 
area according to official statistics (FAO 2005). However, the total area of forests 
continues to decline. According to the most recent Global Forest Resources As-
sessment 13 million hectares of forests are being lost annually. But the rate of de-
cline has slowed in more recent years (FAO 2005, p. xii). The only major region 
of the world with a net gain in forest area during the period 2000-05 is Asia (ibid, 
p. xv). Most of the world’s forests are owned by governments. But private and 
other forms of ownership are increasing, and governments often set aside areas 
for use by communities.
The importance of forests in relation to two of the most important global en-
vironmental threats – climate change, and biodiversity loss – is hard to overstate. 
They have long been recognized as the reservoir and source of much of the spe-
cies biodiversity on the planet (Wilson 1988). They also store more carbon than 
does the atmosphere with 283 gigatonnes (Gt) in biomass alone. These statistics 
about forests are important to convey their immense significance for the survival 
of humanity as a species. But it is other benefits from forests that have been of 
greater interest to common property scholars – the immediate relevance of forests 
to the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of rural residents.2 Forests play a sig-
nificant role in the livelihoods of the rural poor in the context of competing claims 
from multiple parties. Institutional solutions to competing claims are always com-
plex because of the simultaneous importance of forests for global conservation 
and local livelihoods. Such solutions are also provisional and subject to ongoing 
revisions as a result of demographic shifts, developmental processes, changes in 
landscapes, and political alliances among other variables. As Dietz et al. (2003, 
p. 1907) remark, ‘Successful commons governance requires that rules evolve’. 
The fascinating institutional interplay related to socio-ecological complexity and 
contextual change has helped generate a vast corpus of research on forests, both 
within and outside the field of common property.3 The size, variety, and depth 
of this body of research is a reasonable reflection of the many different ways in 
which forests have been, and continue to be, central to human survival, liveli-
hoods, and prosperity. 
Table 1 lists the estimated area under major forms of tenure for the 30 coun-
tries in the developing world with the highest forest cover (Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America) and an additional six developed world nations with large areas under 
2
 Lynch and Talbott (1995) suggest that 447 million people may depend on forests in India, Indo-
nesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand alone. White and Martin 2002 estimate a 
number closer to 500 million for the world. The World Resources Institute suggests that the figure 
may be about 350 million people for the world (WRI 2002). In contrast, the WWF-UK estimates 
the total number of forest-dependent people to be close to 1.2 billion (WWF 2002: 2).
3
 It is worth remembering in this context that most schools of environment at American universities 
today started out as schools of forestry for those interested in forest management.
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forest cover (FAO 2005, White and Martin 2002). Collectively, these countries 
represent more than 80 percent of officially stated forests. Because the areas listed 
for different countries draw from official statistics between the years 2000 and 
2005, the figures in table 1 are at best approximations – indeed, there are no ac-
curate numbers in existence. The table indicates that a nontrivial area of forests 
is either under collective management through community-level institutions, or 
claimed as being owned by community-level actors.
Table 1: Ownership of Forest and Other Wooded Lands (2000/2005, in millions of hectares)
Country name
Public Private
TotalGovernment 
administered
Community 
administered
Community/
Indigenous
Individual/
Firm
Africa
Angola# 59.7 0 0 0 59.7
Botswana# 33.4 3.0 8.4 2.3 47.2
Cameroon# 37.1 0 0 0 37.1
C. African R.# 33.0 0 0 0 33.0
DR Congo# 218.1 0 0 0 218.1
Gabon# 21.8 0 0 0 21.8
Mali# 29.5 0 0 0 29.5
Mozambique# 60.9 0 0 0 60.9
Nigeria# 20.0 0 0 0 20.0
South Africa# 24.0 0 0 7.5 31.5
Sudan* 40.6 0.8 0 0 41.4
Tanzania* 47.9 0.4 0 0 48.3
Zambia# 44.7 0 3.5 0 48.2
Total 670.8 4.2 11.9 9.8 696.7
Asia
China* 58.2 0 70.3 0 128.5
India* 53.6 11.6 0 5.2 70.4
Indonesia# 97.8 0 0 0 97.8
Lao PDR# 20.5 0 0 0 20.5
Malaysia# 20.1 1.4 0 0 21.5
Myanmar# 45.1 0 0 0 45.1
PNG# 1.1 2.1 31.3 0 34.5
Total 296.4 15.1 101.4 5.2 418.5
Latin America
Argentina#,* 71.5 0 0 22.2 93.7
Bolivia* 28.2 16.6 2.8 5.4 53.0
Brazil* 423.7 74.5 0 57.3 555.5
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Chile# 7.4 0 0.6 21.6 29.6
Colombia#,* 54.6 0 24.5 0 79.1
Guyana# 12.3 5 1.8 0 19.1
Mexico# 44.2 27 14.5 0 85.7
Paraguay# 19.4 0 0 0 19.4
Peru#,* 59.8 8.4 22.5 0 90.7
Venezuela# 56.5 0 0 0 56.5
Total 777.6 106.5 66.7 106.5 1057.3
Developed Countries
Australia# 118.5 1.5 0 44.6 164.6
Canada* 388.9 1.4 0 27.2 417.5
Japan* 10.5 0 0 14.6 25.1
Russian Fed.* 809.3 0 0 0 809.3
Sweden* 6.1 0 0 24.1 30.2
United States* 110.0 17.1 0 164.1 291.2
Total developed 1443.3 20.0 0 344.6 1737.9
Total developing 1744.8 125.8 180.0 121.5 2172.1
Total 3188.1 145.8 180.0 466.1 3910.0
Notes: # refers to FAO 2005, and * refers to White and Martin (2002).
Before assessing the implications of the numbers in the table, a few qualifying 
statements are necessary. The figures almost certainly understate the area of land 
under communal arrangements. In several countries where the official statistics 
report the absence of any forest land under communal management of control – 
such as Cameroon, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia in Africa, and Indo-
nesia and Lao PDR in Asia – we know that communities have at least the informal 
rights to administer significant areas of forests (Wily 2001). Case study evidence 
from these and other African countries demonstrates the presence of community-
based governance in forests even if official agencies report a different story to 
international organizations. The data also conceals the story of logging conces-
sions that many countries have given to private corporations. Again, case study 
evidence and national level reports from Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Indonesia, and Myanmar show the sig-
nificant levels of logging being carried out in forests nominally under government 
control.4 The numbers in the table under represent the impact of private/corporate 
and community-level actors in forests in the listed countries.
 Despite potential inaccuracies, the figures also tell their own story. Even a 
cursory examination makes it clear that common property arrangements are far 
4
 See White and Martin (2002, p. 9). Global Forest Watch has produced a number of reports making 
essentially the same point – see http://www.globalforestwatch.org/english/about/publications.htm, 
accessed on June 12, 2006.
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more common, so to speak, in the developing rather than the developed world. 
The greater prevalence of forest commons in the developing world explains in part 
the geographic focus of much of the literature on forest-based commons (Haenn 
2006; Maskey et al. 2006; Pagdee et al. 2006). When the proportion of forest 
area under the control of different actors is compared, government agencies own 
most of the world’s forests: nearly 82 percent. Private and communal/indigenous 
tenure covers 11.9 and 8.3 percent respectively. But in the developing world, the 
position of communal and indigenous actors is far stronger. Private actors possess 
only about 5.6 percent in contrast to the 14.1 percent of forests characterized by 
communal tenure. But since half a billion people or more may be dependent on 
forests for their livelihoods, the total area communities own and control seems 
quite low. Ongoing trends in favor of greater access and control over forests by 
local communities are therefore a welcome step.
Table 2 presents information to show how claims and tenurial rights over for-
ests have been changing since the 1990s.5 Additionally, the set of countries for 
which information could be collected is smaller than that in table 1. Therefore, the 
area currently under community governance through legislation passed in the past 
two decades is likely higher than reported in the table.
Table 2: Area of forests recognized as being under Community Management in the Developing 
World since 1985 and Major Reforms toward Decentralized Tenure
Country Area in Million Hectares Year of Reform
Nature of Legal Reform
Community 
Administration
Community 
Ownership
Bolivia 16.6 2.8 1996 Ancestral rights of commu-
nity groups have precedence 
over concessions; municipal 
governments gain control 
over forest lands; Indigenous 
groups have reserves over 
which they exercise govern-
ance rights.
Brazil 74.5 0.0 1988 Ancestral rights of indig-
enous groups and communi-
ties recognized
Colombia 0.0 24.5 1991 Framework for collective ter-
ritorial rights of indigenous 
groups and Afro-Colombians
5
 The information in table 2 has been collected from several different sources, and therefore the 
numbers may not be strictly comparable across countries.
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India 11.6 – 1989 Joint Forest Management 
with state forest agencies 
recognizing community 
governance
Indonesia 0.6 N/A 2000 Regulatory process for 
customary ownership and 
community concessions
Mozam-
bique
? N/A 1997 Titles for customary tenure 
available
Nepal 1.2 N/A 1996 Community forestry legisla-
tion to recognize governance 
rights
Philippines N/A N/A 1997 Constitution protects ances-
tral domain rights, 1997 Act 
recognizes indigenous tenure
Peru 8.4 22.5 1999 Rights of communities rec-
ognized by law
Sudan 0.8 N/A N/A
Tanzania 0.4 N/A 1999 Customary tenure available 
and protected
Uganda 2000 2000 draft under revision, 
strong program to promote 
devolution
Zambia 1995 Customary tenure recognized 
but titles not available
Total 114.1 49.8
In addition, the following countries either have plans to recognize community rights to ad-
minister or manage forests, or already do so at least on paper: Botswana, Cameroon, CAR, 
Mali, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bhutan, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Thailand.
Sources: Agrawal (2004), ITTO 2005, White and Martin (2002), Wily (2001).
The figures in the table show that the area of forests governed through common 
property institutions has increased substantially in the past two decades. Much 
of this shift has occurred because of new legislation and policy initiatives. Even 
if the potential area transferred to community-level management actions in the 
countries listed at the bottom of the table is just a few hundred thousand hectares 
per country, the total area transferred to a community tenure regime in the past 
20 years may be as much as 200 million hectares (White and Martin 2002; ITTO 
2005). The increasing area under community-oriented tenure regimes can be seen 
as an implicit admission by national or provincial level decision makers that local 
community actors can govern their resources quite effectively when they have the 
opportunity to do so.
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Much of this increase in community control over forests should be viewed as 
part of a process of decentralization by national governments (Andersson et al. 
2006; Brooks et al. 2006; Klepsis 2003; McCarthy 2004). Strictly speaking, what 
is being observed is less an increase in pure community ownership, rather more a 
spread of a new form of commons that is all about co-governance arrangements 
in which country governments are under pressure from a number of sources to 
extend rights to govern natural resources to a larger number of actors (Nygren 
2005; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Wittman and Geisler 2005). These pressures 
include increasing fiscal deficits, aid from international donors that is tied to some 
involvement of local actors, pressures from communities and indigenous groups 
for greater control over their lands, and some evidence that local actors have the 
capacity to protect and use forest resources sustainably and at lower costs than 
government agencies. The continuing increase in forest area controlled by local 
actors significantly increases the relevance of scholarly approaches that focus on 
institutional arrangements to shape user incentives and actions.
At the same time, it also exposes the limited attention scholars of forest com-
mons have paid to other forms of property through which forests are managed. 
Variations in forms of governance in vast areas of forest land under state control 
have attracted little interest from commons scholars, even if they recognize that 
these forests are an important source of livelihood to the poor (but see Bray et al. 
2004; Fearnside 2003; Jepson et al. 2001; Nepstad et al. 2002). In many cases, 
those writing about such forms of governance do not consider themselves as writ-
ing about the commons.
Scholarship on forest commons has certainly in some instances examined how 
commons perform relative to other institutional arrangements in accomplishing 
desired social goals such as conservation, sustainability, and improvements in 
resource condition (Agrawal 1996; Arnold 1998; Netting 1976; Somanathan et 
al. 2005). Other scholars have pointed to the interdependence of different forms 
of property rights and institutional arrangements and thus implicitly questioned 
whether the terms private, common, and state denote distinct domains of govern-
ance or complementary systems that interpenetrate and are therefore better re-
garded as mixed forms (Antinori and Bray 2005; Bray et al. 2006; Grafton 2000). 
However, further comparative research pitting different systems of governance, 
and thereby attempting to identify their specific strengths under specific circum-
stances, would certainly be welcomed by scholars of forest commons.
3. Theoretical and policy contributions
In a very real sense, much of the theoretical work on common property related to 
forests has simultaneous and direct policy relevance. Therefore, instead of exam-
ining the theoretical and policy contributions of the scholarship on forest-based 
commons separately, this section focuses on the different groups of causal vari-
ables that shape the impact on forest conditions. To do so, it draws from Agrawal 
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(2001b) who surveys the scholarship on common property theory and identifies 
four clusters of variables that are relevant to successful governance of the com-
mons: the characteristics of the resource system, the user group, the institutional 
arrangements, and the external environment.
This relatively general set of categories has been used in other analyses of for-
est governance and its relationship to forest conditions as well.6 Essentially, any 
empirical effort to examine how governance-related variables (institutional ar-
rangements) affect forest conditions must simultaneously take into account other 
potential factors that also have an influence over forest condition. These factors 
are conveniently classified into sociopolitical and economic variables (represent-
ed by ‘user group’), biophysical, and edaphic factors (represented by the cluster of 
variables classified as ‘resource system’ characteristics), and demographic, mar-
ket, macropolitical, and other contextual factors (represented by the category of 
factors termed ‘external environment’).
In addition, the paper supplements the cluster of variables used by Agrawal 
(2001b) with insights from the comprehensive contribution of Dietz et al. (2003) 
on adaptive governance. They posit seven distinct requirements of adaptive gov-
ernance in complex systems such as forest-based commons: availability of nec-
essary information, ability to deal with conflict, compliance with rules, provi-
sion of technical, institutional, and physical infrastructure, and ability to adapt 
and change. These requirements, when interpreted in light of concrete empirical 
contexts, translate into a far larger number of variables – evident in the ensuing 
discussion that attempts to apply them to the literature on forest-based commons, 
especially when discussing institutional arrangements.
3.1. Characteristics of the resource system
Characteristics of a forest resource system fall under a broad set of biophysical 
variables.7 They are the set of boundary conditions within which humanly devised 
rules of the game must be situated. Some of the most commonly cited resource 
characteristics relevant to effective governance of forest commons are size of 
the resource system, its boundaries, whether the resource is mobile, the extent to 
which resource units can be stored, rate and predictability of flow of benefits from 
6 See, for example, the cross-country research effort through the International Forest Resources and 
Institutions Program, currently coordinated by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analy-
sis at Indiana University and the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University 
of Michigan. For some research studies based on the IFRI program, see Gibson et al. (2000), and 
Gibson et al. (2005).
7
 Ostrom (2005) includes biophysical variables as one of the set of structuring conditions in her 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Following Ostrom’s earlier work, a number 
of commons scholars have also focused on how specific elements of the natural and ecological 
environment shape the likelihood of successful commons governance. Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) 
in a recent test of common property theory use a dataset on 95 forest governance institutions from 
Himachal Pradesh in India to highlight the importance of altitudinal variation in explaining varia-
tions in resource conditions.
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the resource system, and ease of monitoring resource conditions. Institutional ar-
rangements and technological changes may feasibly help alter some of the above 
features related to resource systems: size of the forest, its boundaries, and poten-
tially, ease of monitoring. But other characteristics are likely to be either beyond 
human capacities to alter, or excessively costly to engineer.
Although research on deforestation and changes in forest condition has often 
paid close attention to the importance of biophysical variables such as soils, to-
pography, fire, and pests (Geist and Lambin 2001, p. 14; Tole 2001), the scholar-
ship on forest-based commons has been less attentive to the importance of such 
factors. Even when research on forest-based commons includes variables related 
to the biophysical environment in explaining resource conditions, its focus tends 
to remain on how property rights or socioeconomic and political variables shape 
outcomes (Gibson et al. 2002; Tucker 1999, but see Tucker et al. forthcoming 
2007). Clearly, far more work to integrate the analysis of causal impact of bio-
physical, social, and institutional factors remains to be done (Agrawal and Chha-
tre 2006). Scholars of adaptive management have made important contributions 
in this regard, and scholars of forest commons can draw on their writings in many 
respects (Cumming et al. 2006; Janssen et al. 2006; Klooster 2002; Mutimukuru 
et al. 2006; Reed and McIlveen 2006). An interesting impact of such cross-dis-
ciplinary work is likely to be a broadening of the dimensions along which com-
mons scholars assess institutional outcomes. For example, existing research on 
adaptive systems and complexity takes resilience and robustness of ecosystems as 
important dimensions along which to evaluate institutional effectiveness whereas 
scholars of forest commons more often focus on forest conditions, livelihoods, 
and equity related issues as measures by which to evaluate outcomes (Berkes 
2004; Turner et al. 2003). 
One biological aspect of forests that has received substantial attention by 
commons scholars is their ability to yield multiple products, which can often be 
harvested to yield significant economic benefits for users without having highly 
adverse effects on the forest itself. Scholars interested in issues of gender equity 
have discussed how non-wood forest products (NWFPs) are critical for the liveli-
hood portfolios of households in much of the developing world. Those interested 
in valuation of tropical forests have similarly found that the net present value of a 
stream of benefits based on NWFPs is often higher than the value from clear fell-
ing the forest. A recent report from the FAO (2005) recognizes that NWFPs are 
one of the most important set of benefits forests provide at a global scale, one that 
is grossly undervalued. In highlighting the value of multiple benefits from forests, 
scholars of forest-based commons have thus helped address concerns about equity 
and livelihoods, as well as sustainable forest management.8
8
 It is worth noting that a number of scholars question the extent to which non-wood forest products 
can be important in alleviating poverty, and are typically a form of safety net that is relevant mostly 
for the really poor (Arnold and Ruiz 2001; Neumann and Hirsch 2000; Wunder 2001).
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3.2. Characteristics of users
In examining user group characteristics, scholars of commons have often used the 
literature on collective action as their starting point. As a result issues related to 
the size of the group, whether the boundaries of the group are clearly defined, the 
nature of heterogeneity among group members, extent of interdependence among 
them and their dependence on the resource, and whether the group possesses suf-
ficient resources to meet the costs of initiating and maintaining collective action 
have been crucial variables to examine (Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Ostrom 1999; 
Agrawal and Goyal 2001). Despite the wealth of work on this set of issues how-
ever, the ways in which these variables influence the probability of collective ac-
tion, and in turn the condition of forests, continues to be contested.
The nature of disputes is clear when one examines the role of group size 
(Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Ostrom 1999), but especially evident in relation to 
group heterogeneity. It can fairly be argued that most resources are managed 
by groups divided along multiple axes, among them ethnicity, gender, religion, 
wealth, and caste (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Different dimensions of social 
versus political versus economic heterogeneity have potentially differing impacts 
on resource governance (Baland and Platteau 1999, p. 773; Bowles and Gintis 
1998: 4). These difficulties in knowing which dimensions of heterogeneity are 
relevant in a given context and, for what reasons, are compounded by difficulties 
in generating measures of heterogeneity that capture its many different dimen-
sions and their potentially divergent effects on resource governance outcomes. 
The divergent conclusions of a large number of empirical studies suggest that 
similar kinds of group heterogeneities may produce different effects under differ-
ent circumnsances (Adhikari and Lovett 2006; Neupane 2003)
Recognizing the important and unclear effects of heterogeneity on the gov-
ernance of the commons, Baland and Platteau (1996) provide an initial attempt 
to classify them into three types: in endowments, interests, and identities. They 
hypothesize that heterogeneities of endowments have a positive effect on resource 
management, whereas heterogeneities of identity and interests create obstacles to 
collective action.9 However, their effort needs further analysis and discussion. The 
categories into which they classify heterogeneities are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, heterogeneities of interests or identities may lead to different types of 
economic specialization and different levels of endowments, which could in turn 
lead to mutually beneficial exchange. Nor is it clear that heterogeneities in iden-
tities and interests are necessarily obstacles to collective action. Other scholars 
have distinguished between the role of heterogeneity in assisting the emergence 
of collective action, but hindering its maintenance. Finally, Poteete and Ostrom 
(2004) suggest that it is difficult to identify direct relationships between hetero-
9
 Their point about heterogeneities of endowments enhancing the possibilities of collective action 
draws from Olson (1965) and Hardin (1982) which provide strong theoretical justifications about 
why heterogeneous groups with a small number of extremely well off individuals may be able to 
overcome the problem of collective action if it is in their strong interest to provide a collective 
good.
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geneities and resource governance outcomes because the effects of heterogenei-
ties are mediated by institutions, and relatively little research on the subject has 
attempted to identify the independent and mediating effects of institutions. Their 
argument is an important extension of earlier suggestions that institutions mediate 
the effects of contextual variables such as population, markets, and other socio-
economic factors on resource conditions. But despite the increasing amount of 
work on group level heterogeneities and inequalities, both theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence on the subject is highly ambiguous.10 It is possible to ensure effec-
tive resource governance even in groups that have high heterogeneities in interest 
through coercive enforcement of conservationist rules (Jodha 1986; Peluso 1993, 
but see also Libecap 1989).
However, the impact of intragroup heterogeneities on distribution of benefits 
from forests may be more amenable to definition (Adhikari 2005). Significant 
research on forest-based commons suggests that the economically and politically 
better-off group members are often likely to gain a larger share of benefits from 
a resource (Agrawal 2001a). This is not to say that intragroup inequalities are a 
result of collective action; rather, it is simply to point out that inequalities within a 
group are not necessarily reduced because group members are willing to cooper-
ate toward a collective goal when there are high levels of existing inequalities.
A related user group characteristic over which there has been significant re-
search concerns poverty. Poverty directly relates to the ability of users to gener-
ate the necessary resources and capacity to protect and regulate common pool 
resources. But precisely what this truism means for the success of institutional-
ized protection and allocation of resource-based benefits is still not certain. Does 
poverty leads to a greater reliance on the commons (Jodha 1986) and therefore 
incentives for their conservation or for higher levels of harvesting and degrada-
tion, or do increasing levels of wealth, at least initially, lead to greater degradation 
of commons? These are questions whose answers are not certain. Similarly, there 
is at least some divergence of views over whether the poor benefit more from the 
commons in comparison to those who are better off. However, one major contri-
bution of scholars of forest-based commons on this issue has been to highlight 
the importance of equity concerns and poverty issues in the regulation and use of 
commons. 
In summary, whether the relationship between different measures of suc-
cessful governance of forest commons, and group characteristics such as size, 
heterogeneity, interdependence, dependence on forests, and poverty is negative, 
positive, or curvilinear seems subject to a range of other contextual and mediating 
factors, not all of which are clearly understood (Agrawal 2001b). Broadly speak-
10
 As illustration, see Baland and Platteau (1999), Engel et al. (2006), Kanbur (1992), McPeak 
(2003), and Quiggin (1993) for conflicting assessments based on theoretical modeling, and 
Adhikari and Lovett (2006), Molinas (1998), Varughese and Ostrom (2001) as empirical examples 
that illustrate similar disputes about the effects of heterogeneity.
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ing, smaller, interdependent, more homogeneous, and relatively well off groups 
that are dependent on their resources and do not suffer sudden shocks in their 
demands upon the resource are more likely to be successful in creating institutions 
that help regulate forest commons more effectively. But the effects of these vari-
ables in specific conditions can vary.
The theoretical work related to inequalities and heterogeneities by commons 
scholars has an important bearing on how specific forms of social heterogeneities 
such as those related to gender, indigeneity, ethnicity, class, and income affect 
outcomes. The politics of gender and indigeneity has been especially prominent 
in this regard in the contributions of scholars of forest commons (Freudenberger 
et al. 1997; Holt 2005, Larsen 2003).
3.3. Characteristics of institutional arrangements
Institutions and how their variations influence forest conditions are the intense 
focus of research by scholars of forest-based commons from the very beginnings 
of research on the commons. This research has thus led to many generalizations 
that help clarify our understanding of the effects of rules on user incentives and 
behavior. Rules that are easy to understand and enforce, locally devised, take into 
account differences in types of violations, help deal with conflicts, and help hold 
users and officials accountable are most likely to lead to effective governance. 
These basic insights, of which several had been asserted in case studies of the 
commons for long, were stated systematically by McKean (1992) and Ostrom 
(1990) and more recently by Dietz et al. (2003, p. 1910). Much of this conven-
tional wisdom on the nature of effective local institutions has also been confirmed 
by the contributions of researchers on forest commons.
Although institutional features-related findings of forest-commons scholars 
are highly policy relevant, their adoption – quite apart from the politics that shape 
all policy making and implementation – needs additional translation work that has 
yet to be undertaken. Consider an example. It may appear that statements such as 
‘rules should be locally created and enforced’ are quite transparent. But what they 
mean in terms of practical implementation in concrete contexts is in fact quite 
open to interpretation because of instabilities in the meanings of every operant 
word in the phrase: rule, local, creation, and enforcement.
The import of the insight lies in the recognition that: a) local users and their or-
ganizations have comparative if not absolute advantage when it comes to knowing 
about the resource, other users, and environmental conditions, and b) local users 
are best equipped to use this knowledge to create institutional arrangements more 
suited to governing forests effectively. But even if one accepts the point that those 
with better knowledge about the resource will use it to promote more sustainable 
and equitable outcomes, ‘rules should be locally created and enforced’ remains 
quite abstract without clarification about types of rules, meaning of local and the 
basis of qualification as local, how rules should be created and provisions made 
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to change them, and forms of enforcement. Ostrom (2005) suggests that there 
may be literally hundreds of thousands of different rule combinations from which 
decision makers can choose. Polity interpretation of seemingly clear and concrete 
recommendations runs headlong into this plethora of local rule diversity.
In many situations, some kinds of rules may be better designed by those not 
at the local level. But what local means in this context is also contested (Raffles 
1999). Local can be defined in terms of birth, residency, contiguity of location, 
degree of dependence on the resource, contributions to the creation of a local insti-
tution, and so forth. The organizations or set of decision-makers charged with cre-
ating and modifying rules may be elected (through a variety of rules), nominated 
or appointed (by many potential authorities), and may adopt rules in many differ-
ent ways as well. Enforcement comes in many varieties, raising questions about 
who should enforce, how strictly, for what remuneration, and who will monitor 
the enforcer. The economy of expression in findings related to institutions is thus 
a function of heroic abstraction from the context that theoretical knowledge of the 
commons takes for granted.
3.4. Nature of the external environment
Variables related to the external environment can also be seen as constituting the 
context within which the objects of interest for forest commons scholars – the 
configuration of common property arrangement, common pool resource, and user 
group – are located. Demographic, cultural, technological, market-related fac-
tors, the nature of state agencies, and the level of involvement of other actors and 
forces such as NGOs and international aid flows are issues to which those inter-
ested in deforestation have been more attentive than scholars of forest commons, 
but which are extremely important structuring variables in relation to the units of 
analysis that are the central concerns of research on the common.
It would be fair to say that existing research on the commons has begun to 
address these environmental or contextual variables in the past few years. But 
to the extent these factors have received attention among scholars of forest com-
mons they have often been identified as less important than institutional factors. 
The result is an intriguing disjuncture in the research findings of those interested 
in explaining deforestation vs condition of forest-based commons. Thus popula-
tion levels and changes and market pressures are seen by most scholars of defor-
estation to be critically important causal factors (Young 1994). In contrast, those 
focusing on forests as commonpool resources have often arrived at conclusions 
in which roads and population pressures are relatively less important an explana-
tion of resource conditions. The inconsistency between the findings of these two 
groups of scholars may well have to do with differences in their levels of analysis, 
regional focus, and/or use of cross-sectional versus time-series data.
This inconsistency also suggests that there may be productive avenues of dia-
log between the research of those who focus on markets and market institutions 
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and demographic shifts as critical influences on commons governance, and those 
who focus primarily on community institutions (Bray et al. 2006; Brown 2000; 
Clark 2004; Goeschl and Igliori 2006; Power 2006). It is important especially to 
underline the importance of market institutions in shaping what happens to forests 
as new arenas of exchange in relation to carbon and watershed services take shape 
(Taylor 2005). Similarly, demographic and broader economic shifts have been 
taken by a number of scholars as harbingers of forest transitions where processes 
leading to deforestation have begun to yield to greater areas under forests in some 
countries and regions (Kauppi et al. 2006; Victor and Ausubel 2000).
Analogous to market articulation is the question of technological means avail-
able to use and harvest the commons. Emergence of technological innovations that 
transform the cost-benefit ratios of harvesting benefits from commons are likely 
to undermine the sustainability of institutions needed to govern them as well as 
the resources themselves. Indeed, technological changes are capable of disrupting 
not just the extent to which existing mechanisms of coordination around mobility, 
storage, and exchange can continue to serve their members, but the very nature 
of the political and economic calculation that goes into inventing and defining 
common property. Under many situations, state officials have become closely 
involved in the privatization of commons and the selling of products resources 
previously held under common property arrangements (Rangarajan 1996; Sivara-
makrishnan 1999; Skaria 1999).
Of course, the current landscape of tenure transformations is far more com-
plex, to say the least. The state may always have been central in determining the 
changing areas of forests available to communities as the ultimate guarantor of 
property rights arrangements (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). But in the past two 
decades, an increasing number of governments has decentralized control over di-
verse natural resources to local user groups. These shifts make questions about the 
reasons behind such loosening of control and the effects of differences in organi-
zation of authority across levels of governance extremely important. The work on 
forest-policies related decentralization has begun to explore these issues, either by 
focusing on decentralization of forest management (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001) 
or by examining the role of resource management-related laws and national poli-
cies (Lynch and Talbott 1995). But more systematic examination clearly remains 
to be done. It is only by integrating central policy concerns with the theoretical 
issues, which have been the major focus of research on forest commons, that the 
scholarship on forest commons will gain greater visibility and interest. 
4. Directions for future research
If recent general reviews of writings on deforestation have been forced to recog-
nize the critically important role of institutions and policies (Geist and Lambin 
2001; Kaimowitz and Angelson 1998), interventions by scholars of commons 
and community forests are responsible in no small measure. Indeed, the review of 
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scholarship on forest commons demonstrates its close association with the devel-
opment of the field of common property itself. However, the discussion also hints 
at a number of areas in which far more work remains to be done. For example, 
Dietz et al. (2003, p. 1908) show that different institutional configuration of pri-
vate ownership, communal tenure, and government control are each compatible 
with improvements, declines, and stability in forest conditions. This central find-
ing hints at the importance of context, but we still need to track down how context 
matters to commons governance in complex social situations.
In addition, there are other important sites of knowledge production which 
need significantly greater attention to improve what we know about successful 
governance, use, and conservation of forests. The discussion below focuses on 
gaps in knowledge about forest-based commons along three different dimensions: 
data, theory, and methods. These three interrelated and interdependent domains 
constitute the three legs on which scientific knowledge rests. Admittedly it does 
so always in a provisional and unstable fashion as befits a three-legged stool. But 
that is surely the character of all scientific advancement.
4.1. Data related to forest-based commons
There are of two types data-related gaps in the study of forest-based commons. 
The first relates to its conventional focus on forest-related institutions. Thus, a 
persistent and general complaint by scholars of commons concerns the absence of 
reliable cross-sectional and longitudinal datasets on governance strategies at the 
local level. New research, especially by scholars associated with the International 
Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Program, but also by CIFOR and WRI 
is beginning to address this data gap along several different dimensions. The work 
by IFRI scholars is focused directly on data on local institutions, their variations, 
and changes over time. The work of CIFOR-researchers is harder to categorize 
because of its variety, but is relatively more focused on the role of variables relat-
ed to the external environment in deforestation. Research by scholars associated 
with WRI has been very useful in advancing the understanding of forest-policy 
related decentralization initiatives, particularly in African countries.
But there are other areas in which knowledge about forest-based commons 
remains quite poor. A critical such arena is simply descriptive: we have very 
little knowledge even about the area under common property regimes in differ-
ent countries. The tables in this review are built on the basis of relatively scat-
tered sources of information and can make no pretense to accuracy. Indeed, the 
state of knowledge even within national contexts is poor. The state of affairs is 
well described by the strategy that the recent global Forest Resource Assessment 
adopted. It located all community-based tenure under the category ‘other’!
In addition to the lack of knowledge about the spatial distribution of area under 
communal tenure and institutional variation within this broad category, we also 
know far too little in the aggregate – either at the national or at the global level – 
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about most of the sources of influence that may have produced such variation, or 
the potential effects of such variations. For this reason, more data on this theme is 
critical to the advancement of the field in general to situate case-based research as 
well as for statistically oriented studies of forest-based commons. 
 Finally, there are many specific areas in which scholars of forest commons can 
vastly improve the scope of their substantive contributions by drawing on scholar-
ship that may not go under the name of commons, but has very similar concerns 
and investigative foci. There is substantial literature, as this review has pointed 
out, on indigenous peoples and forests, importance of markets and market institu-
tions on local and extra-local forest-related outcomes, and interactions between 
biophysical and social-institutional variables where forest-related outcomes are 
concerned. These literatures provide important avenues for commons scholars to 
broaden the scope of their investigations, enrich their substantive concerns, and 
increase the impact of their contributions.
4.2. Theories of forest-based commons governance
Current research on forest-based commons can be advanced substantially if re-
searchers distinguish clearly among the major outcomes that commons institu-
tions shape. This survey does not distinguish among such outcomes as sustain-
ability of resource use, equity in allocation of benefits, management efficiency, 
resilience of resource systems, or conservation effectiveness because the literature 
itself does not carefully distinguish among these multiple outcome dimensions. In 
an abstract sense it is easy to recognize that these different outcomes may either 
be associated positively or negatively, depending on the context, and range of 
focus. In some situations, a focus on enhancing institutional or resource system 
resilience may be feasible, and go together well with improvements in equitable 
allocation of benefits from the commons. But where the social context itself is 
extremely inequitable, a focus on improving equity may undermine institutional 
resilience. Similarly, an exclusive focus on maximizing equity may not only un-
dermine performance along the dimension of resilience, but also other perform-
ance dimensions. However, we do not know if it actually does so.
Similarly, although new data can help to shed light on the governance of for-
est-based commons, urgent theoretical development is equally necessary. There 
are entire new domains in which theoretical contributions are needed to improve 
what we know about governance, and through which studies of forest-based com-
mons can substantially advance the social science. I focus on two for the purpose 
of illustration: the relationship between institutions and identities and cross-level 
analysis of the effectiveness of governance arrangements.
The ways in which new institutions and social relations generate worldviews 
among individuals subjected to them has been a concern of major social-science 
scholars ever since the founding of the social sciences. In relation to forest gov-
ernance, the question is basic. Do different institutions of governance have dif-
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ferent effects on the way people view forests and the environment? The effects of 
different ways of thinking about forest use, conservation, and management among 
those subject to governance are likely central to the possibility of effective gov-
ernance (Agrawal 2005). However, the vast investigative energies of scholars of 
forest-based commons have scarcely attended to this fundamental question about 
the relationship between institutions of governance and identities of actors. To 
review the research on forest-based commons is to infer that there may be no such 
relationship. But such an inference would be no more than a reflection of the ab-
sence of theoretical lenses that permit the imagining of this possibility and subse-
quently the collection of data to investigate it. Pursuing this question theoretically 
would be a major contribution to nearly all the disciplines of the social sciences 
because each of them is interested in the relationship between institutions and 
identities, even if the language used to talk about this relationship varies across 
disciplines: i.e. rules and preferences, subjectivities and norms, and perceptions 
and practices. Institutions are not just the product of existing preferences – they 
are also in important ways the generators of new preferences.
The second issue is much more squarely within the sights of those interested 
in forest-based commons, but still needs more careful theoretical development. 
How do processes at multiple social and institutional levels interact with each 
other to generate outcomes relevant to forest governance? Significant progress 
on the issue is hobbled by slow development of theoretical approaches that can 
take advantage of existing data at multiple levels. Scholars of commons need a 
better understanding of the conditions under which macro-level processes struc-
ture what happens at the local level and conversely, when local processes and 
outcomes overwhelm the structuring role of more macro-level processes.
4.3. The search for appropriate methods
The conventional strategy of case-based research and comparative case analy-
sis, which has been so central to forest-commons research, is likely to retain an 
important position given the nationally and locally specific interests of many of 
those who work on the commons. Surely, case-based methods can also be used 
to good effect in the analysis of data across levels of analysis and to fill many of 
the gaps identified in this review. But to use new data in light of new theoreti-
cal frameworks and models effectively, it will also be necessary for scholars of 
forest-based commons to take recourse to new methods and methodological ap-
proaches. One can already witness the upsurge in research that takes advantage 
of large amounts of data to deploy more advanced statistical techniques than had 
been true for much of the 1980s and 1990s.
Some possibilities in this direction are signaled by such fields of exciting theo-
retical development as complex systems research and agent-based models. Others 
may lie in more advanced statistical models that can take advantage of the nested 
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nature of data, or incorporate spatial features of the data more explicitly into the 
analysis. Other methodological innovations are likely to prove useful even with 
the kind of research and data that are currently available. One example of such 
innovation may be through a meta-analysis of existing case studies. Given the 
extraordinary richness of case-based work on forest commons, new analytical 
methods to compare findings from cases can prove extremely useful.
5. Conclusion
This review has suggested that the scholarly work on forest-based commons has 
helped greatly to identify the institutional factors that help lead to sustainable 
resource governance. However, the extent to which it has successfully found 
visibility in relation to global concerns about deforestation and the relationship 
between forests and livelihoods remains an open question (but see Nepstad et 
al. 2006). For example, in the most recent Global Forest Resources Assessment 
(FAO 2005), there is little discussion of the research on commons, or of the im-
portance of institutions and property rights in shaping forest-related outcomes. 
Despite the significant proportion of forests that are governed under communal or 
community-based arrangements, the assessment fails to include a single reference 
from the field of commons. Similarly, there is little mention of work by commons 
scholars in one of the most widely read recent publications on poverty and devel-
opment (Sachs 2005). Despite the common knowledge about the extent to which 
poor households rely on commons, especially forest commons for significant as-
pects of their livelihoods, those focusing primarily on poverty have remained inat-
tentive to the contributions of commons scholars.
Such a disjuncture – between the focus of research that has hitherto guided 
scholars of forest-based commons and the pressing questions related to forests 
and their fate and livelihoods – is in part a result of the continuing and nearly 
single-minded concentration of commons scholarship on institutions and property 
rights. Future research by scholars of forest-based commons needs therefore to 
incorporate more explicitly issues related to the role of biophysical factors and 
additional dimensions of institutional effectiveness, the relationship between re-
search and policy effectiveness, the relationship between various levels of analy-
sis, and the extent to which corruption and violence may undermine the sustain-
ability of resource governance. Scholars of forest commons need also to integrate 
their research more insistently with substantive concerns about indigeneity and 
indigenous peoples, concrete forms of social heterogeneities and inequalities, ef-
fectiveness of international aid, and local livelihoods and poverty.
But even apart from these new issues, which may be profitably incorporated 
into the scholarship on forest commons, there are avenues of research that can be 
explored with advances in the domains of new data, theories, and methods. This 
review has argued that through such advances, scholarship on the commons will 
build necessary bridges to other research questions than those focused on varia-
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tions in property regimes, and which are also central to advancing the social sci-
ences and enhancing policy effectiveness.
Literature cited
Adhikari, B. 2005 Poverty, property rights and collective action: Understanding 
the distributive aspects of common property resource management. Environ-
ment and Development Economics 10:1-25,
Adhikari, B. and J. Lovett. 2006 Institutions and collective action: Does het-
erogeneity matter in community-based resource management? Journal of 
Development Studies 42(3):426-45,
Agrawal, A. 1996. The Community versus the Market and the State. Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 9(1):1-15.
Agrawal, A. 2001a State formation in community spaces? Decentralization of 
control over forests in the Kumaon Himalaya, India. Journal of Asian Studies 
60(1):1-32,
Agrawal, A. 2001b Common property institutions and sustainable governance of 
resources. World Development 29(10):1649-72,
Agrawal, A. 2004. Decentralization of resource policies in the developing 
world, 1980-2005. Papers presented at the CHAOS-Cambridge University 
Press seminar series at University of Washington, Seattle, June.
Agrawal, A. 2005 Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Mak-
ing of Subjects. Durham, NC, Duke University Press,
Agrawal, A. and A. Chhatre. 2006 Explaining success on the commons: Com-
munity forest governance in the Indian Himalaya. World Development 
23(1):149-66,
Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: The 
role of community in natural resource conservation. World Development 
27(4):629-49.
Agrawal, A. and S. Goyal. 2001. Group size and collective action: Third-party 
monitoring in common-pool resources. Comparative Political Studies 
34(1):63-93.
Agrawal, A. and E. Ostrom. 2001. Collective Action, Property Rights and 
Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal. Politics and Society 
29(4):485-514.
Agrawal, A. and G. Yadama. 1997. How do social institutions mediate market 
and population pressures on resources? Forest Panchayats in Kumaon India. 
Development and Change 28: 435-65.
Andersson K. P, C.C. Gibson and F. Lehoucq. 2006. Municipal politics and 
forest governance: Comparative analysis of decentralization in Bolivia and 
Guatemala. World Development 34(3): 576-95.
Antinori, C. and D. B. Bray. 2005. Community Forest Enteprises as Entre-
prenuerial Firms: Economic and Institutional Perspectives from Mexico. 
World Development 33(9): 1529-43.
131Forests, Governance, and Sustainability
Arnold, J. E. M. 1998. Managing Forests as Common Property. FAO Forestry 
Paper 136. Rome: FAO.
Arnold, J.E.M. and W.C. Stewart. 1991. Common Property Resource Manage-
ment in India. Oxford, UK: Oxford Forestry Institute, University of Oxford.
Arnold, J.E.M. and M.R. Ruiz. 2001. Can Non-Timber Forest Products Match 
Tropical Forest Conservation and Development Objectives? Ecological Eco-
nomics 39:437-47
Baland, J. and J.P. Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is 
There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baland, J. and J.P. Platteau. 1999. The ambiguous impact of inequality on local 
resource management. World Development 27(5): 773–88.
Berkes, F. (ed). 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-
Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.
Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking community based conservation. Conservation Biol-
ogy 18(3): 621-30.
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis. 1998. Effective Redistribution: New Rules of Mar-
kets, States, and Communities. In Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for 
Communities, States, and Markets, Eric Olin Wright, ed., pp. 3-71. Verso: 
London.
Bray, D.B., E.A. Ellis, N. Armijo Canto and C.T. Beck 2004. The institutional 
drivers of sustainable landscapes: A case study of the ‘Mayan Zone’ in Quin-
tana Roo, Mexico. Land Use Policy 21: 333-46.
Bray, D.B., C. Antinori, and J.M. Torres-Rojo. 2006. The Mexican model of 
community forest management: The role of. agrarian policy, forest policy and 
entrepreneurial organization. Forest Policy and Economics 8(4): 470-84.
Brooks, J.S., M.A. Franzen, C.M. Holmes, M.N. Grote, and M. Borgerhoff 
Mulder. 2006. Testing hypotheses for the success of different conservation 
strategies. Conservation Biology 20(5): 1528-38.
Brown, G.M. 2000. Renewable natural resource management and use without 
markets. Journal of Economic Literature 38(4): 875-914.
Clark, J. 2004. Forest policy for sustainable commodity wood production: an 
examination drawing on the Australian experience. Ecological Economics 
50(3-4): 219-32.
Cumming, G.S., D.H.M. Cumming, and C.L. Redman. 2006. Scale mismatches 
in social-ecological systems: Causes, consequences, and solutions. Ecology 
and Society 11 (1).
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. Stern. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. 
Science 302: 1907-12.
Engel, S., R. Lopez, and C. Palmer. 2006. Community-industry contracting over 
natural resource use in a context of weak property rights: The case of Indone-
sia. Environmental and Resource Economics 33: 73-93.
Fearnside, P.M. 2003. Deforestation Control in Mato Grosso: A New Model for 
Slowing the Loss of Brazil’s Amazon Forest. Ambio 32(5): 343–45
132 Arun Agrawal
Fernandes, W., G. Menon, and P. Viegas. 1988. Forests, Environment, and 
Tribal Economy. New Delhi: Indian Social Institute.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2005. Global Forest Resources As-
sessment. Rome: Food and Agriculture Research Organization.
Freudenberger, M. S., J. A. Carney and A. R. Lebbie. 1997 Resiliency and 
change in common property regimes in West Africa: The case of the tongo in 
the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Society and Natural Resources 10(4): 
383-402.
Geist, H.J. and E.F. Lambin. 2001. What Drives Tropical Deforestation? Uni-
versity of Louvain. Louvain la Neuve: Land use and Land Cover International 
Project.
Gibson, C., M.A. McKean, and E. Ostrom (eds). 2000. People and Forests: 
Communities, Institutions, and Governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gibson, C.C., F.E. Lehoucq, and J.T. Williams. 2002. Does privatization protect 
natural resources? Property rights and forests in Guatemala. Social Science 
Quarterly 83(1, March): 206-25.
Gibson, C., E. Ostrom, and J.T. Williams. 2005. Local enforcement and better 
forests. World Development 33(2): 273-84.
Goeschl, T. and D.C. Igliori. 2006. Property rights for biodiversity conservation 
and development: Extractive reserves in the Brazilian Amazon. Development 
and Change 37(2): 427-51.
Grafton, R. Quentin. 2000. Governance of the Commons: A Role for the State? 
Land Economics 76(4): 504-17
Guha, R. 1989. The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance 
in the Himalaya. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Haenn, N. 2006. The changing and enduring ejido: A state and regional ex-
amination of Mexico’s land tenure counter-reforms. Land Use Policy 23(2, 
April): 136-46.
Hardin, R. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Holt, F.L. 2005. The Catch-22 of conservation: Indigenous peoples, biologists, 
and cultural change. Human Ecology 33(2): 199-215.
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). 2005. Status of Tropical 
Forest Management. ITTO Technical Series N. 24, Yokohama, Japan: ITTO
Jessup, T.C., and N.L. Peluso. 1986. Minor forest products as common property 
resources in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. In Proceedings of the Conference 
on Common Property Resource Management, National Research Council, pp. 
501-31. Washington DC: National Academy Press.
Kaimowitz, D. and A. Angelson. 1998. Economic Models of Tropical Defor-
estation: A Review. Bogor: CIFOR.
Kanbur, R. 1992. Heterogeneity, distribution and cooperation in common prop-
erty resource management. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
133Forests, Governance, and Sustainability
Kauppi, P.E, J.H. Ausubel, J. Fang, A.S. Mather, R. A. Sedjo, and P. E. Wag-
goner. 2006. Returning forests analyzed with the forest identity. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 103: 17574-79
Klooster, D.J. 2002. Toward adaptive community forest management: Integrat-
ing local forest knowledge with scientific forestry. Economic Geography 
78(1): 43-70.
Larsen, S.C. 2003. Promoting Aboriginal territoriality through interethnic alli-
ances: The case of the Cheslatta T’en in Northern British Columbia. Human 
Organization 62(1): 74-84.
Lemos, M.C. and A. Agrawal. 2006. Environmental governance. Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 31: 297-325.
 Libecap, G. 1989. Distributional issues in contracting for property rights. Jour-
nal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145:6-24.
Lynch, O.J. and K. Talbott. 1995. Balancing Acts: Community-Based Forest 
Management and National Law in Asia and the Pacific. Washington DC: 
World Resources Institute.
Maskey, V., T.G. Gebremedhin, and T.J. Dalton. 2006. Social and cultural de-
terminants of collective management of community forests in Nepal. Journal 
of Forest Economics 11(4): 261-74.
McCay, B.J., and J. Acheson (eds) 1987. The Question of the Commons: The 
Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press.
McKean, M. 1992. Success on the commons: A comparative examination of 
institutions for common property resource management. Journal of Theoreti-
cal Politics 4(3): 247-81.
McPeak, J.G. 2003. Analyzing and addressing localized degradation in the com-
mons. Land Economics 79(4, November): 515-36.
Molinas, J.R. 1998. The impact of inequality, gender, external assistance, and 
social capital on local level cooperation. World Development 26(3): 413-31.
Mutimukuru, T.W. Kozanayi and R. Nyirenda. 2006. Catalyzing collaborative 
monitoring processes in joint forest management situations: The Mafungautsi 
forest case, Zimbabwe. Society and Natural Resources 19(3): 209-24
National Research Council (NRC). 1986. Proceedings of the Conference on 
Common Property Resource Management. Washington DC: National Acad-
emy Press.
Nepstad, D., D. McGrath, A. Alencar, A.C. Barros, G. Carvalho, M. Santilli, 
M. del C. Vera Diaz. 2002. Frontier governance in Amazonia. Science 295: 
629-31.
Nepstad, D., S. Schwartzman, B. Bamberger, M. Santilli, D. Ray, P. Schleising-
er, P. Lefebvre, A. Alencar, E. Prinz, G. Fiske, and A. Rolla. 2006. Inhibition 
of Amazon deforestation and fire by parks and indigenous lands. Conserva-
tion Biology 20:65-73
134 Arun Agrawal
Netting, R. McC. 1976. What Alpine peasants have in common? Observations 
on communal tenure in a Swiss village. Human Ecology 4(2): 135-46.
Neumann, R.P. and E. Hirsch 2000. Commercialization of Non-Timber Forest 
Products:  Review and Analysis of Research. Bogor, Indonesia, Center for 
International Forestry Research.
Neupane, H. 2003. Contested impact of community forestry on equity: Some 
evidence from Nepal. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 2(2): 55-61.
Nygren, A. 2005. Community-based forest management within the context of 
institutional decentralization in Honduras. World Development 33(4): 639-55.
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Ostrom, E. 1999. Self Governance and Forest Resources. Occasional Paper No. 
20, Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. http://www.
cgiar.org/cifor.
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press.
Pagdee, A., Y.S. Kim, and P.J. Daugherty. 2006. What makes community forest 
management successful: A meta-study from community forests throughout the 
world. Society and Natural Resources 19(1, January): 33-52.
Peluso, N.L. 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Peluso, N.L. 1993. Coercing Conservation: The politics of state resource con-
trol. Global Environmental Change 3(2):199 – 218
Peluso, N.L. and P. Vandergeest. 2001. Genealogies of the political forest and 
customary rights in Indonesia. Journal of Asian Studies 60(3): 761-812.
Power, T.M. 2006. Public timber supply, market adjustments, and local econo-
mies: Economic assumptions of the northwest forest plan. Conservation Biol-
ogy 20(2): 341-50.
Poteete, A. and E. Ostrom. 2004. Heterogeneity, group size, and collective ac-
tion: The role of institutions in forest management. Development and Change 
35(3): 435-61.
Quiggin, J. 1993. Common Property, Equality, and Development. World Devel-
opment 21(7): 1123–38.
Raffles, H. 1999. ‘Local theory’: Nature and the making of an Amazonian place. 
Cultural Anthropology 14(3): 323-60.
Rangan, H., and M. Lane. 2001. Indigenous peoples and forest management: 
Comparative analysis of institutional approaches in Australia and India. Soci-
ety and Natural Resources 14(2): 145-60.
Rangarajan, M. 1996. Fencing the Forest: Conservation and Ecological Change 
in India’s Central Provinces, 1860-1914. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press.
135Forests, Governance, and Sustainability
Reed, M.G. and K. McIlveen. 2006. Toward a pluralistic civic science?: Assess-
ing community forestry. Society and Natural Resources 19(7): 591-607.
Ribot, J.C. 1999. Decentralization, participation, and accountability in Sahe-
lian forestry: Legal instruments of political-administrative control. Africa 
69(1):23-65.
Ribot, J. 2002. Democratic decentralization of natural resources: Institutional-
izing popular participation. Working Paper, Washington: World Resources 
Institute.
Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty. New York: Penguin.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. 1999. Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental 
Change in Colonial Eastern India. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Singh, C. 1986. Common Property and Common Poverty: India, Forests, Forest 
Dwellers, and the Law. 
Skaria, A. 1999. Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers, and Wildness in Western 
India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Somanathan, E., R. Prabhakar, and Bhupendra Singh Mehta. 2005. Does de-
centralization work? Forest conservation in the Indian Himalayas. Discussion 
Paper 05-04. New Delhi: Indian Statistical Institute. 
Stanley, D.L. 1991. Communal forest management: The Honduran resin tap-
pers. Development and Change 22(4, October): 757-79.
Taylor, P.L. 2005. A Fair Trade approach to community forest certification? A 
framework for discussion. Journal of Rural Studies 21(4): 433-47.
Tole, L. 2001. Jamaica’s disappearing forests: Physical and human aspects. 
Environmental management 28(4): 455-67.
Tucker, C.M. 1999. Private versus common property forests: Forest conditions 
and tenure in a Honduran community. Human Ecology 27(2, June): 201-30.
Tucker, C.M., J.C. Randolph, and E.J. Castellenos. Forthcoming (2007). Institu-
tions, biophysical factors, and history: An integrative analysis of private and 
common property forests in Guatemala and Honduras. Human Ecology.
Turner, N.J., I.J. Davidson-Hunt, and M.O’Flaherty. 2003. Living on the edge: 
Ecological and cultural edges as sources of diversity for social-ecological 
resilience. Human Ecology 31(3): 439-61.
Varughese, G. and E. Ostrom. 2001. The contested role of heterogeneity in 
collective action: Some evidence from community forestry in Nepal. World 
Development 29(5, May): 747-65.
Victor, D.G. and J.H. Ausubel. 2000. Restoring the forests. Foreign Affairs 79: 
127-44.
White, A. and A. Martin. 2002. Who Owns the World’s Forests? Forest Tenure 
and Public Forests in Transition. Washington DC: Forest Trends and Center 
for International Environmental Law.
Wilson, E.O. (ed.) 1988. Biodiversity. Washington, D.C., National Academy 
Press.
136 Arun Agrawal
Wily, L.A. 2001. Reconstructing the African commons. Africa Today 48(1, 
Spring): 77-99 
Wittman, H. and C. Geisler. 2005. Negotiating locality: Decentralization and 
communal forest management in the Guatemalan highlands. Human Organi-
zation 64(1): 62-74.
World Resources Institute (WRI). 2002. World Resources. Washington DC: 
World Resources Institute.
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). 2002. Forests for Life: Working to Pro-
tect, Manage, and Restore the World’s Forests. Gland: World Wide Fund for 
Nature.
Wunder, S.  2001. Poverty Alleviation and Tropical Forests-What Scope for 
Synergies? World Development  29:1617-33.
Young, K.R. 1994. Roads and the environmental degradation of tropical mon-
tane forests. Conservation Biology 8(4):972-76.
